Temporal Aspects of Smart Contracts for Financial Derivatives

Implementing smart contracts to automate the performance of high-value over-the-counter (OTC) financial derivatives is a formidable challenge. Due to the regulatory framework and the scale of financial risk if a contract were to go wrong, the performance of these contracts must be enforceable in law and there is an absolute requirement that the smart contract will be faithful to the intentions of the parties as expressed in the original legal documentation. Formal methods provide an attractive route for validation and assurance, and here we present early results from an investigation of the semantics of industry-standard legal documentation for OTC derivatives. We explain the need for a formal representation that combines temporal, deontic and operational aspects, and focus on the requirements for the temporal aspects as derived from the legal text. The relevance of this work extends beyond OTC derivatives and is applicable to understanding the temporal semantics of a wide range of legal documentation

Why is there anything at all? What does it mean to be a person? Rescher on metaphysics

In this essay, I set out key aspects of Nicholas’ Rescher’s Metaphysical Perspectives. I illustrate the tenor and value of the text based on extended analysis of Chapter 1 on fundamental issues of what there is and Chapter 2 on personhood. Rescher is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century. His works are intrinsically interesting, but also important as resources for realists working in the social sciences

Physical Logic

In R.D. Sorkin's framework for logic in physics a clear separation is made between the collection of unasserted propositions about the physical world and the affirmation or denial of these propositions by the physical world. The unasserted propositions form a Boolean algebra because they correspond to subsets of an underlying set of spacetime histories. Physical rules of inference, apply not to the propositions in themselves but to the affirmation and denial of these propositions by the actual world. This physical logic may or may not respect the propositions' underlying Boolean structure. We prove that this logic is Boolean if and only if the following three axioms hold: (i) The world is affirmed, (ii) Modus Ponens and (iii) If a proposition is denied then its negation, or complement, is affirmed. When a physical system is governed by a dynamical law in the form of a quantum measure with the rule that events of zero measure are denied, the axioms (i) - (iii) prove to be too rigid and need to be modified. One promising scheme for quantum mechanics as quantum measure theory corresponds to replacing axiom (iii) with axiom (iv) Nature is as fine grained as the dynamics allows.Comment: 14 pages, v2 published version with a change in the title and other minor change

The art of being human : a project for general philosophy of science

Throughout the medieval and modern periods, in various sacred and secular guises, the unification of all forms of knowledge under the rubric of ‘science’ has been taken as the prerogative of humanity as a species. However, as our sense of species privilege has been called increasingly into question, so too has the very salience of ‘humanity’ and ‘science’ as general categories, let alone ones that might bear some essential relationship to each other. After showing how the ascendant Stanford School in the philosophy of science has contributed to this joint demystification of ‘humanity’ and ‘science’, I proceed on a more positive note to a conceptual framework for making sense of science as the art of being human. My understanding of ‘science’ is indebted to the red thread that runs from Christian theology through the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment to the Humboldtian revival of the university as the site for the synthesis of knowledge as the culmination of self-development. Especially salient to this idea is science‘s epistemic capacity to manage modality (i.e. to determine the conditions under which possibilities can be actualised) and its political capacity to organize humanity into projects of universal concern. However, the challenge facing such an ideal in the twentyfirst century is that the predicate ‘human’ may be projected in three quite distinct ways, governed by what I call ‘ecological’, ‘biomedical’ and ‘cybernetic’ interests. Which one of these future humanities would claim today’s humans as proper ancestors and could these futures co-habit the same world thus become two important questions that general philosophy of science will need to address in the coming years

Why the fair innings argument is not persuasive

The fair innings argument (FIA) is frequently put forward as a justification for denying elderly patients treatment when they are in competition with younger patients and resources are scarce. In this paper I will examine some arguments that are used to support the FIA. My conclusion will be that they do not stand up to scrutiny and therefore, the FIA should not be used to justify the denial of treatment to elderly patients, or to support rationing of health care by age. There are six issues arising out of the FIA which are to be addressed. First, the implication that there is such a thing as a fair share of life. Second, whether it makes sense to talk of a fair share of resources in the context of health care and the FIA. Third, that 'fairness' is usually only mentioned with regard to the length of a person's life, and not to any other aspect of it. Fourth, if it is sensible to discuss the merits of the FIA without taking account of the 'all other things being equal' argument. Fifth, the difference between what is unfair and what is unfortunate. Finally, that it is tragic if a young person dies, but only unfortunate if an elderly person does

Can processes make relationships work? The Triple Helix between structure and action

This contribution seeks to explore how complex adaptive theory can be applied at the conceptual level to unpack Triple Helix models. We use two cases to examine this issue – the Finnish Strategic Centres for Science, Technology & Innovation (SHOKs) and the Canadian Business-led Networks of Centres of Excellence (BL-NCE). Both types of centres are organisational structures that aspire to be business-led, with a considerable portion of their activities driven by (industrial) users’ interests and requirements. Reflecting on the centres’ activities along three dimensions – knowledge generation, consensus building and innovation – we contend that conceptualising the Triple Helix from a process perspective will improve the dialogue between stakeholders and shareholders

The ‘Galilean Style in Science’ and the Inconsistency of Linguistic Theorising

Chomsky’s principle of epistemological tolerance says that in theoretical linguistics contradictions between the data and the hypotheses may be temporarily tolerated in order to protect the explanatory power of the theory. The paper raises the following problem: What kinds of contradictions may be tolerated between the data and the hypotheses in theoretical linguistics? First a model of paraconsistent logic is introduced which differentiates between week and strong contradiction. As a second step, a case study is carried out which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance may be interpreted as the tolerance of week contradiction. The third step of the argumentation focuses on another case study which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance must not be interpreted as the tolerance of strong contradiction. The reason for the latter insight is the unreliability and the uncertainty of introspective data. From this finding the author draws the conclusion that it is the integration of different data types that may lead to the improvement of current theoretical linguistics and that the integration of different data types requires a novel methodology which, for the time being, is not available

The ‘Galilean Style in Science’ and the Inconsistency of Linguistic Theorising

Chomsky’s principle of epistemological tolerance says that in theoretical linguistics contradictions between the data and the hypotheses may be temporarily tolerated in order to protect the explanatory power of the theory. The paper raises the following problem: What kinds of contradictions may be tolerated between the data and the hypotheses in theoretical linguistics? First a model of paraconsistent logic is introduced which differentiates between week and strong contradiction. As a second step, a case study is carried out which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance may be interpreted as the tolerance of week contradiction. The third step of the argumentation focuses on another case study which exemplifies that the principle of epistemological tolerance must not be interpreted as the tolerance of strong contradiction. The reason for the latter insight is the unreliability and the uncertainty of introspective data. From this finding the author draws the conclusion that it is the integration of different data types that may lead to the improvement of current theoretical linguistics and that the integration of different data types requires a novel methodology which, for the time being, is not available

Bound States and the Special Composition Question

The Special Composition Question asks under what conditions a plurality of objects form another, composite object. We propose a condition grounded in our scientific knowledge of physical reality, the essence of which is that objects form a composite object when and only when they are in a bound state – whence our Bound State Proposal. We provide a variety of reasons in favour of a mereological theory that accommodates our Proposal. We consider but reject another proposal, which is quantum-physical in nature: the Entanglement Proposal. We close by responding to Teller’s ‘Suit Objection’